Security issues in security products are more common than might be assumed, as an MWR advisory on a Carbon Black product has recently shown.
An attacker crafts a malicious advert that uses the vast online profiling of users by advertising companies to display an advert to people interested in detecting attackers. The advertising campaign carries a sinister payload: if the advert displays in someone’s browser, the attacker will get complete control of every system in their organization.
Surely this is just an attacker's fantasy? Unfortunately not. MWR has recently published an advisory on the Carbon Black Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) product where a web based cross site scripting (XSS) issue in the analyst portal can lead to total control of all monitored endpoints.
Attackers generally focus on areas that are relatively low cost to develop exploits for and that provide the largest potential victim population. In the past this was the operating system but as they become harder targets, focus is switching to software installed in the OS. MWR is seeing a focus on defensive products by attackers in Incident Response engagements and are exploiting these opportunities in our targeted attack simulations.
Security issues in security products are more common than might be assumed. This is in part because such products are often highly complex, highly privileged and highly exposed. It will always be difficult to prevent security issues in this combination.
Consider the following case studies:
So the question is raised, how do organizations ensure that defensive products that are intended to reduce the risk of compromise don’t leave them exposed to unexpected or unanticipated risks?
The key is to treat security software just like any other software and ensure implementations have a strong architecture.
When implementing a security product (or indeed anything that changes the attack surface of the organization) it needs to be architected well. If an analyst’s portal could potentially lead to privileged code execution across the enterprise then that portal needs to be segregated from attackers. Ideally this means a separate hardened computer not connected to the internet and preferably not to the rest of the corporate network is used to access the portal so that the attack surface is reduced.
The product or service being installed should be threat modelled by your organization, appropriately segregated and itself monitored so that the risk of compromise is contained and chances of detecting compromise increased.
Other steps include questioning your vendors on their product security. Key questions to ask are:
Once installed and configured, the solution can then be technically tested to ensure it has been set up correctly and that vendor security claims have been validated.
These considerations are important for all changes to your environment and particularly those that will have high privileges, access to sensitive assets or are directly reachable by attackers. Active management of your attack surface is management of the routes available to an attacker. Only through strong architecture and assurance can you ensure that efforts reduce rather than increase the risk.